The Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power … To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States.” In other words, the Constitution gives the federal government the exclusive authority to administer the District of Columbia. Under this arrangement, the District cannot fall under the jurisdiction of any state.

Why did the Framers write this arrangement into the Constitution? James Madison explains in Federalist Paper 43: “Without (complete authority at the seat of government), not only the (federal government) might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the (federal) government on the State comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the (federal government) an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other (states).”

It is inherently problematic to make the security of the supreme government dependent on an entity other than itself. This concern is very much alive today. On January 5, D.C. mayor Muriel Bowser claimed that D.C. police were “well trained and prepared to lead the law enforcement, coordination and response to allow for the peaceful demonstration of First Amendment rights.” The very next day, this “well trained and prepared” police force could not stop a mob from breaking into the Capitol, insulting and interrupting the proceedings of Congress. In this instance, relying on D.C. police for security had disastrous consequences. At least under the current arrangement, Congress can make any reforms it deems necessary to ensure this doesn’t happen again.

To comply with the Constitution, D.C. statehood advocates suggest shrinking the size of the federally administered zone to encompass only the important federal buildings while allowing the rest of the District to become a state. But, as attorney R. Hewitt Pate points out, “this federal enclave could not function as a self-contained entity. It is inextricably connected by sewer systems, water systems, roads, and … dependence on the New Columbia for fire protection, police protection and the like would raise any number of jurisdictional problems.” This is precisely the situation James Madison feared: Such an outsized dependence on a single state would provide that state an outsized influence on the federal government.

Despite this rationale behind the Framers’ intentions, it isn’t strictly unconstitutional to shrink the size of D.C. The New Columbia Statehood Commission reminds us that “Congress has the authority to redefine the borders of the federal district and shrink its size, as it did in 1846, when the portion west of the Potomac was returned to Virginia.” However, this raises the question: Why not return the remaining portion to Maryland instead of creating a whole new state? Indeed, “unlike other states,” writes Hewitt Pate of the Heritage Foundation, “the District does not possess the ‘multiplicity of interests’ Madison described in Federalist 51 as the essence of civil government.” Besides, it is far more reasonable to address any concerns about voting representation by reincorporating D.C. into Maryland rather than dethroning Rhode Island as the smallest state in America. But of course, D.C. statehood advocates care more about increasing Democratic power in the Senate than about reasonably addressing these concerns.

Nevertheless, the issue of voting representation still stands, as does the Framers’ argument against statehood. The better solution, therefore, is not to add another state to the Union but rather to add an amendment to the Constitution providing D.C. with a voting member in the House of Representatives.