By David Green

I have argued previously that the presidential election of 2004 is the most momentous one in seventy years, if not all of American history. This, of course, implies that this year voters have a real choice between two very different visions for America’s future.

I still emphatically believe this to be true, but ironically, in considering how a Kerry administration’s foreign policy would compare to Bush’s, there are nevertheless some striking similarities. In some ways, when it comes to foreign policy, Kerry’s departure from Bush is not so much in what he would do, but what he wouldn’t do.

To understand this question, it is crucial to properly describe the context of our current historical moment. Since World War II, American presidents and congresses have pursued a set of foreign policies which revolved around certain key themes, such as building alliances, supporting multilateral institutions and solutions to common problems, advancing values such as democracy and human rights (with notable and regrettable exceptions), and of course, protecting American security. Over a period of sixty years, presidents as ideologically different as Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan crafted foreign policies which nevertheless fit essentially within these parameters.

The Bush administration represents a radical break from this tradition. They would have you believe that 9/11 precipitated this shift, and that they are responding accordingly. It did not, and they are not. The administration’s top ranks are populated by far-right neoconservative ideologues who disparage multilateral institutions, international law and even allies, and who believe in using American military power to reshape the world in their image.

All of these themes were evident from the beginning of the Bush administration, in the short period before 9/11. They were manifested in the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile, Kyoto global warming and International Criminal Court treaties, among other moves. We also know that the Bush gang was planning to invade Iraq since before they even came to office. In this sense, 9/11 gave them political cover for actions which would otherwise have been even more troubling for the American public than they were, including the unprovoked (and therefore illegal) invasion of a sovereign state, and the trashing of the UN and America’s traditional allies when they objected to that act.

Many Americans, having seen the wisdom of the postwar international institutions and cooperative structures created by previous generations (if you’re unsure of the value of these, compare world history during the first half of the 20th century with that of the second), are profoundly uncomfortable with this extreme and cavalier unilateralism, all the more so now that Americans represent 90 percent of the casualties in Iraq, and pay for all of the $200 billion the war has cost so far, because the Bush folks alienated so many potential burden-sharing allies. But 9/11 gives the administration cover for these policies.

In this sense, then, a Kerry administration represents a probable ‘return to normalcy’ (to borrow Warren Harding’s phrase). I would expect his foreign policies to look very much like those of every president since WWII except George W. Bush. Of course, 9/11 means Kerry fighting a real war against al Qaeda (note that I didn’t say terrorism), which none of his predecessors fought, including W. And following Bush means cleaning up after him in terms of America’s standing among our allies and in world opinion, and of course in Iraq. Otherwise, my guess is that Kerry’s policies would look a lot like Clinton’s, which looked a lot like George H.W. Bush’s, which looked a lot like…

The most crucial foreign policy issues for the United States in the next four years are the following: Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, repairing relations with traditional allies, repairing America’s standing in world opinion, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global warming and international economic justice.

On the first two of these, which are of the most immediate concern, it is hard to find in their public pronouncements any significant differences between what Kerry and Bush would do. In practice, however, my guess is that Bush would probably be more likely than Kerry to cut and run out of Iraq (yes, you read that right) following the U.S. election, but neither of them have offered much of a plan.

Similarly, Kerry has not distinguished himself much from Bush on the question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is a shame, as a president with wisdom, resourcefulness and courage could exert leverage on both parties and finally cut the Gordian Knot there that does so much international damage. Neither of the two nations are at all well-served by their own policies relating to this conflict, though neither of them are yet smart enough to know it. This is precisely true of the United States as well, though especially tragic, as it is perhaps the only one of the three capable of solving the problem for all.

Kerry would undoubtedly tremendously improve America’s standing in world opinion and among our allies, but so would a rotting head of lettuce. Far more than Americans, these external “constituents” – often as or more affected by US policy decisions than Americans – are gasping for the return to normalcy that anybody other than Bush would represent.

It’s not clear that Kerry would be significantly more successful than Bush in dealing with the thicket that is arms proliferation when it comes to the Iran’s and North Koreas of the world, but he might be more likely to exercise the patient meticulousness necessary to track loose nukes throughout the world, and to adequately address domestic security vulnerabilities. Most assuredly, he would not create an axis of evil list and then attack one country on it without provocation, driving the others into a scramble to acquire deterrent weapons systems before they are next.

A Kerry foreign policy would probably also make some marginal attempts to address global warming and economic fairness issues, but I would be surprised if he were terribly bold in this regard. He talks some about reducing American dependency on foreign oil, but Kerry would have to be far more assertive a president than he is a candidate to make that a reality.

At the end of the day, a President Kerry would probably be better known for what he doesn’t do than what he does. But because the Bush administration represents such a radical departure from American foreign policy traditions, just being ‘not Bush’ would still represent a dramatic change.

David Green is a professor of political science. Professor Green?s research and teaching interests include comparative politics, international relations, European and American politics, foreign policy and international organization.